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The Kemalist Revolution and the Foundation of the One-Party Regime in Turkey: A Political Analysis

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Kısa Özgeçmiş

Prof. Dr. Hakan Yılmaz, Galatasaray Lisesi'nden ve Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Ekonomi Bölümü'nden mezun oldu. Master ve doktora derecelerini A.B.D.'de Columbia Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü'nden aldı. Halen Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü'nde öğretim üyesidir ve aynı üniversitenin Avrupa Çalışmaları Merkezi'nin ve Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı'nın yürütme kurullarında görev yapmaktadır. Yılmaz, yakın dönem Türk siyasal hayatı; Türkiye'de siyasal ve popüler kültür; Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerinin ve Avrupa bütünleşmesinin kültür ve kimlik boyutları; demokratikleşme sürecinin dış dinamikleri üzerinde çalışmaktadır. Yılmaz'ın proje yürütücüsü olarak görev aldığı bazı araştırma projeleri şunlardır: "Türkiye'de Halkın Avrupa Birliği Karşısındaki Tutumları" (2002; Ali Çarkoğlu, Refik Erzan ve Kemal Kirişçi ile birlikte); "Türkiye'yi Avrupa Haritası'na Sokmak" (2002; Ali Akay, Duygu Köksal, Arzu Öztürkmen ve Aslı Özyar ile birlikte); "Türkiye'de Avrupa Şüpheliği" (2004); "Türkiye'de Muhafazakarlık" (2006); "Türk ve Fransız Gençleri Arasında Münazaralı Diyalog Geliştirme" (2006; Semih Vaner, Emre Erdoğan, Güçlü Atılğan, Levent Ünsaldı, Arzu Öztürkmen ve Marie-Hélène Sauner ile birlikte); "Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Kimliğin Rolü: Fransa ve Almanya Örnekleri" (2007). Yılmaz'ın yakın zamanlardaki bazı yayınları şöyle sıralanabilir: *Placing Turkey on the Map of Europe* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2005); "Islam, Sovereignty, and Democracy: A Turkish View" (*Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 477-493); "Euroskeptizismus in der Türkei - Parteien, Eliten und öffentliche Meinung, 1995-2006" (in *Die Türkei und Europa*, ed. Gabriele Clemens, Hamburg: LIT-Verlag, Studien zur Neueren Europäischen Geschichte Bd. 1, pp. 215-243, 2007); "Turkish Conservatism and the Idea of Europe" (in *Between Europe and the Mediterranean: The Challenges and the Fears*, ed. Paul Sant Cassia and Thierry

Fabre, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp. 137-161), “Turkish Identity on the Road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German Oppositional Discourses” (*Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Volume 9, Issue 3, 2007, pp.293-305); ve “Euroskepticism in Turkey: Parties, Elites and Public Opinion, 1995-2006” (forthcoming in *South European Society and Politics*, spring 2008).

The Kemalist Revolution and the Foundation of the One-Party Regime in Turkey: A Political Analysis¹

INTRODUCTION

The Turkish ideological scene has recently witnessed a strong comeback of Kemalism in the form of *neo-nationalism* (*ulusalcılık*, in Turkish). The Kemalist neo-nationalism of today basically represents a defensive line of thinking: firstly, defending the nation-state in the face of the attacks of ethnic separatism, European integration, and globalization; and, secondly, defending the secular order against the growing tide of Islamic conservatism. The actors behind neo-nationalism are many, ranging from soldiers to former communists, and having a large audience among the secular urban upper classes. The neo-nationalism of today has been actually the third revision of Kemalism since the 1960s, each revision being couched in terms of a different ideology. Kemalism was first revised and revived in the 1960s, in the form of a national developmentalist variety of socialism. The actors of this first, left-wing Kemalist revival were civilian intellectuals and university students, pursuing strategies of revolution-from-above or revolution-from-below for putting their ideas into action. In its second revision, in the 1980s, Kemalism was wedded with right-wing neo-conservatism, and the resulting amalgam was called the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. The progenitors of this neo-conservative version of Kemalism were the military rulers of the country, who had come to power after the military coup of 1980. In this article, I will attempt to put Kemalism in its proper historical context, by offering an analysis of the political actors and their strategies during the Kemalist revolution, and showing the linkages between developments in the domestic political arena and events that were happening in Turkey’s international environment.

The modern Turkish state was founded by the Kemalist revolution of 1918-1927. How did Kemalism differ from the previous Ottoman bureaucratic movements and what were the basic institutions of the Kemalist political regime? These will be the two main questions to be dealt with in this paper. I will argue that the Kemalist revolution of 1918-1927 was the last instance of the power struggles since the early 19th century between the modern Ottoman bureaucracy and the imperial center around the sultan. With the Kemalist revolution, the Kemalist leaders, who were the military and civilian bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire, abolished the sultanate and established their own authority over the state and society.

¹ This paper has been written more than ten years ago. I have made only minor and mostly formalistic revisions before it went into publication. My apologies are due to many authors who have produced a number of excellent works on some of the topics I am discussing here, which I could not consult due to time limitations.

By the end of the 18th century the Ottoman Empire began to decline as a result of the defeats in war and the emergence of the provincial powerholders challenging the sultan's central authority. To cope with these two dimensions of the imperial decline, the imperial center started a series of radical reforms to replace the old and inefficient army and civil bureaucracy with modern personnel and institutions modelled after their counterparts in Europe. However, as soon as it developed into a sizeable and capable force by the early 19th century, the modern bureaucracy began to question the legitimacy and the limits of the sultan's authority. All the major parties of the modern bureaucracy, from the Young Ottomans to the Young Turks to the Kemalists, pursued the strategy of decreasing the sultanic powers and increasing the powers of the bureaucracy. The weapon that the Sultan had developed to fight the external challenges to his empire was now targeting himself. And it was this weapon, the modern bureaucratic apparatus, that eventually killed the Sultanic authority during the Kemalist revolution¹.

The Kemalist revolution lasted approximately nine years and was accomplished in two major stages. In the first stage, that covered the six-year period from the onset of the War of Independence in the fall of 1918 to the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, the political and religious authority of the Ottoman imperial center was liquidated. The three-year-long second stage started with the abolition of the caliphate, and it ended in October 1927, when Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) delivered his famous long Speech (*Nutuk*) to the second congress of the Republican People's Party, offering the most authoritative outline of the official history and ideology of the revolution. The main task of the Kemalists in the second stage of the revolution was to eliminate their rivals within the military, civil bureaucracy, and the National Assembly (the parliament), and to suppress the religious and Kurdish nationalist revolts against the secular Turkish state. It was in that second stage that the basic institutions of the one-party regime were consolidated.

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION: THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SULTANIC AUTHORITY, 1918-1924²

The Kemalist revolution represented the liberation of the Ottoman bureaucracy from the Sultan. The Kemalist revolution consisted of the Ottoman bureaucracy's successful endeavor to abolish the supreme political authority of the Sultan and to establish the exclusive authority of the bureaucracy over the state and society. The Kemalist revolution was the conclusion of the 19th century struggles between the bureaucratic and Sultanic powers. It was the finale of the modern Ottoman bureaucracy's constant efforts during the 19th century to liberate itself from the political supremacy of the Sultan, to increase its autonomy vis-a-vis the Sultan, and to expand its sphere of influence in the state and society. The Kemalist revolution was therefore a *bureaucratic* revolution. That it was also a *revolution* meant that it was a breach with the previous bureaucratic liberation movements in the Ottoman Empire, including those of the Young Ottomans between 1876-1878 and the Young Turks between 1908-1918, which had quite substantially increased the bureaucratic autonomy relative to the Sultanic authority but never succeeded in completely eliminating the powers of the Sultan. The Kemalists were the fourth generation of the bureaucratic movements in the Ottoman Empire, following the Three Strong Pashas of the Tanzimat, the Young Ottomans, and the Young Turks. It was only after the Young Turk leadership left the scene in 1918 following the Ottoman defeat in the First World War that the doors to political power became opened

for the Kemalists.

The three top leaders of the Kemalist movement, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) (1881-1938), İsmet Pasha (İnönü) (1884-1973), and Fevzi Pasha (Çakmak) (1876-1950) were not among the prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) or the Young Turk party³. Before joining the anti-occupation resistance movement in 1919/1920, all three were career soldiers in the Ottoman army rather than political militants. Before the Mondros Armistice of October 1918, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was the commander of the special Storm Forces in charge of Cilicia and Syria. After the armistice he returned to İstanbul, and stayed there with no active duty until May 1919 in which date Sultan Mehmet VI (r. 1918-1922) sent him to eastern Anatolia in the capacity of the Inspector of the Third Army. His mission was to make sure that the Third Army conforms to the demobilization requirements of the ceasefire treaty. Soon after he passed to Anatolia, however, Mustafa Kemal Pasha joined the resistance movement and he resigned from the army on July 8, 1919. Fevzi Pasha was Chief of the General Staff and later the Ottoman Minister of War from late 1918 until early 1920. His initial hostility to the nationalist cause is on the record, and he joined the nationalist movement on April 8, 1920, just two weeks before the convention of the first National Assembly in Ankara. İsmet Pasha served in the Ottoman Ministry of War as undersecretary and in other high capacities from October 1918 until he joined the nationalist movement in Ankara in March 1920.

Unlike the CUP leaders Enver, Talat and Cemal Pashas who had been politicized in their early twenties, the Kemalist leaders entered politics in their late thirties and early forties and only after the anti-occupation resistance movement, organized in most cases by the underground CUP cells, had grown autonomously in various Anatolian towns and cities. In fact, it was precisely to stop that autonomous resistance movement that the last Ottoman Sultan, Mehmet VI or Vahdettin, sent Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Anatolia in the capacity of the Inspector of the Third Army in eastern Anatolia. Nevertheless, after he arrived in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal chose to lead the resistance movement rather than to try to halt it on behalf of the Sultan acting under British auspices. From that point on, he spent all his energies to recruit other career soldiers to the resistance movement, most notably İsmet and Fevzi Pashas, the latter having just resigned his post as the Ottoman Minister of War.

The Mondros Armistice of October 30, 1918 marked the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I. By that time, the CUP cabinet had already resigned on October 8 and the triumvirate of Enver, Cemal and Talat Pashas were about to flee the country (they would do so on November 7). The Mondros treaty provided for a total and unconditional surrender of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman navy and armies, including the armies still operating in the eastern front, were to be demobilized, and all communication and transportation facilities and food and coal supplies were to pass to the control of the Allied powers. The Straits were to be opened to the passage of the Allied warships. The treaty included special provisions for the Armenian population of the empire, such as the releasing of all Armenians held in the Ottoman prisons whatever their crimes were. The Allies reserved for themselves the right to occupy any strategic area of the empire, and particularly the six Armenian-populated eastern provinces, in case of disorder⁴.

With the exception of Mosul in Iraq, which would be occupied by the British soon after the Mondros Armistice, the Arab-populated Iraqi, Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian provinces of

the Ottoman Empire had already fallen to the British or French forces right before the conclusion of the Mondros Armistice. Kirkuk had fallen in May 1918; and Nablus, Haifa, Acre, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Alexandretta, and Beirut had been occupied in September-October 1918. Thus, by the time the Mondros treaty had been concluded, the territory of the Ottoman Empire had already been reduced to Anatolia (including eastern Thrace and Istanbul).

The Turks formed the majority in western and central regions of Anatolia, with sizeable Greek minorities living in Istanbul and the Aegean. Eastern Anatolia was home to the Armenians remaining after the expulsion of 1915, the Kurds, and the Turks. Calculations based on the 1914 census show that, out of the 11 million people living in Anatolia (excluding eastern Thrace and Istanbul), 85% were Muslims (Turks and Kurds), 9% were Greeks, 5% were Armenians, and 0.8% were Jewish and other non-Muslims. In eastern Thrace, the total population was approximately 630,000, of which 57% were Muslims, 35% were Greeks, 3% were Armenians, and 4% were Jewish and other non-Muslims. Finally, the population of Istanbul was divided between the Muslims (60%), the Greeks (25%), the Armenians, Jews, and other non-Muslims (15%) (Kili 1982b: 72).

In the year that followed the Mondros Treaty, Istanbul and parts of Anatolia, and particularly those regions with sizeable Armenian and Greek minorities, also came under the occupation of the Allied powers and the Allied-supported armed forces of Greece. On November 13, 1918, the Allied warships anchored in the port of Istanbul, though the official occupation of the city did not yet begin. In December 1918 the French occupied the southeastern Anatolian province of Adana (Cilicia). At about the same time, the British forces entered Antep, Birecik, Maraş and Urfa in southeast, Batum and Kars in northeast, and Samsun in the Black Sea coast of Anatolia. On March 16, 1919 Istanbul was officially taken under Allied occupation. Beginning from March 28, 1919 the Italian forces landed on the western Mediterranean city of Antalya and its environs. Finally, on May 15, 1915, accompanied by the Allied warships, the Greek forces began occupying the city of İzmir and the Aegean region.

The new situation created by the occupations was formalized in the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Entente powers on August 10, 1920. According to the Sèvres Treaty, the Arabian peninsula and Mesopotamia (Iraq) was ceded to Great Britain; Syria and the southeastern Anatolian provinces of Antep, Mardin, and Urfa was taken by France; eastern Thrace, and İzmir and its environs were surrendered to Greece; and western Anatolia except İzmir was designated as the economic dominion of Italy. The Sèvres Treaty also stipulated that an independent Armenian state under American mandate would be created in northeastern Anatolia, and an autonomous Kurdistan would be established in southeastern Anatolia. According to the terms of the treaty, all the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire who had been previously expatriated would be allowed to return to their homelands and their initial wealth and property would be returned to them. Istanbul was left as the Ottoman capital and the seat of the sultan, but the Straits was taken under the control of an international commission. The Ottoman government was denied the right to have armed forces other than a gendarmerie for internal security purposes. The Ottoman finances were to be regulated by a permanent Allied commission and part of the Ottoman revenues was to be reserved for payments of reparations to the Allies⁵.

The circumstances created by the treaties of Mondros and Sèvres, and especially the prospect of the foundation of Armenian and Greek states in Anatolia, led many Turks in the occupation zones to found Defense of Rights Committees and to start an armed resistance movement. Thus, in the course of November-December 1918 three such committees were formed: Committee for the Defense of the Ottoman Rights (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Osmaniye Cemiyeti*) in İzmir, Committee for the Defense of Thrace (*Trakya Paşaeli Cemiyeti*) in Thrace, and Committee for the Defense of Rights of Eastern Provinces (*Vilayat-ı Şarkıyye Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*) in Istanbul. The Defense of Rights Committees were accompanied by urban and rural guerilla wars against the occupation forces.

The Kemalists entered the stage after these initial organizations and forms of nationalist resistance had already taken root. What Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Kemalist revolutionaries did was, first, to organize the various Defense of Rights Committees into a centralized resistance organization called the Committee for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli (CDRAR). This was achieved in the Sivas Congress of the regional defense of rights committees in September 1919. The CDRAR elected among its members an executive council, called the Council of Representatives, headed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. The second strategy of the Kemalists in centralizing the resistance efforts was to call for the convention of a congress of the elected representatives of the nation. That national congress, called the Grand National Assembly, convened in Ankara in April 1920. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected as the chairman of the Grand National Assembly.

Another contribution of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the Kemalists to the nationalist cause was to replace the irregular guerilla forces by a regular army called the National Forces (*Kuvva-i Milliye*). For this purpose, Mustafa Kemal Pasha recruited many Ottoman officers to serve in the new army, among them the former Ottoman Minister of War Fevzi Pasha and another high official of the Ottoman military establishment İsmet Pasha. Some other Ottoman generals, such as the commander of the eastern army Kazım Pasha, followed suit and their participation provided the Kemalists with significant supplies of equipment and armaments. In addition to the soldiers, many other lower and higher members of the Ottoman bureaucracy and members of the last Ottoman parliament which had been closed down by the Allies in January 1920 also joined the Kemalists. However, the formation of a new army was no easy task. One obstacle was the severe lack of war materiel and the difficulties of recruiting soldiers for a seemingly hopeless war among the impoverished, war-torn, and skeptical peasants of Anatolia. The second obstacle was the unwillingness of the irregular forces to accept the discipline of a central army. Hence, it took a virtual civil war for the Kemalists to suppress the guerilla army of Çerkes Ethem.

The historical advantage of the Kemalists in conducting the war of independence was the friendship of Soviet Russia. It was a fateful moment in which Russia withdrew its territorial claims over Anatolia and İstanbul, and, more significantly, aided the Turks in their war against the western European powers. This fateful moment was no doubt due to the Bolsheviks' being busy at home consolidating the gains of the 1917 revolution. Russian friendship provided the Kemalists with much needed arms and monies. More importantly, however, Russian withdrawal from the war and the cessation of Russian support for the Armenian nationalist struggle in eastern Anatolia immediately secured the Kemalists' eastern front and made it possible to concentrate their forces against the Greek forces in western Anatolia. The new friendly relations between the Soviet government of Russia and the

Kemalist government in Ankara were formalized in the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921⁶.

It was after securing the eastern front with the March 1921 Treaty of Moscow that the National Forces of the Kemalists won their first victory against the Greek army in Sakarya in August 1921. The Sakarya victory proved the efficiency of the National Forces and the capacity of the Kemalist leadership, and it paved the ground for the French recognition of the Ankara government as the legitimate government of Turkey. The Turco-French agreement of October 20, 1921 provided for the French withdrawal from southeastern Anatolia and the fixation of the Turkish-Syrian border. The Italians followed suit by evacuating their occupation zones in Anatolia, holding in their hands only the Dodecanese islands in the Aegean. In this manner, the Allies, except for the British, left the Greek occupation forces alone with the National Forces of the Ankara government. The Greek forces were further weakened by the instability and indecisiveness in their command and control centers caused by the severe political feuding inside Greece between the monarchists and anti-monarchists.

The final war between the Turkish National Forces and the Greek forces was fought in August 1922, and it ended with a Turkish victory. The remaining Greek forces, and with them many local Greeks fearing retributions, quickly evacuated Anatolia, and the National Forces took İzmir back on September 9, 1922. The liberation of İzmir and the Aegean was followed by the withdrawal of the Greek forces from eastern Thrace, under the terms of the Mudanya Armistice between Great Britain and the Ankara government on October 11, 1922. In this manner, eastern Thrace, Istanbul, and Anatolia was saved from foreign occupation, with all the credits going to the National Forces and its Kemalist leadership⁷.

Less than three weeks had passed after the Mudanya Armistice that the Grand National Assembly accepted on November 1, 1922 a revolutionary proposal by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and abolished the sultanate. This should not create the impression that the deputies and the Kemalist leadership of the anti-occupation struggle had declared their anti-monarchic intentions from the beginning. On the contrary, at the time of the first convention of the Grand National Assembly in April 1920 "the delegates were very reluctant to take any steps that might be construed as rebellious, and tried desperately to maintain legal continuity. ... The nationalists proclaimed their loyalty to Mehmed Vahideddin, Sultan of the Empire and Caliph of Islam, and reaffirmed their desire to rescue him from enemy hands." (Lewis 1968: 251). In fact, the oath that each deputy took in the opening ceremony unequivocally stated that they would pursue not other goal than the emancipation of the fatherland, nation, sultanate, and caliphate from foreign rule (Kili 1982b: 64).

Until after the Mudanya Armistice finalized the military victory of the National Forces, none of the resistance leaders, including Mustafa Kemal Pasha, ever made public his intentions of abolishing the Sultanate and changing the regime to a republic. In those days, the official cause of the war as declared by the Kemalist leadership in various occasions, including several declarations made by Mustafa Kemal himself, was to save the Sultan-Caliph from the encroachment of the foreigners. In his famous Speech (*Nutuk*) in 1927, Mustafa Kemal defended his earlier position by saying that his true intentions had always been anti-Sultanistic and republican but that he had kept them in his heart like a "national secret" (Atatürk 1984: 44-46).

It was only after the War of Independence ended in victory that Mustafa Kemal Pasha

decided to reveal part of his "hidden intentions" and he put before the National Assembly a draft legislation separating the caliphate from the sultanate and abolishing the sultanate. The initial reaction of most the deputies was far from supportive. Even the prestige of the victorious commander of the War of Independence did not seem to have put enough weight on the deputies for convincing them to put an end to the rule of the Ottoman dynasty. When prestige could not do the job, Mustafa Kemal Pasha resorted to the Young Turk tactic of threat and intimidation:

"Gentlemen, Sovereignty and Sultanate are not given to anyone by anyone because scholarship proves that they should be; or through discussion or debate. Sovereignty and Sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was by force that the sons of Osman seized the sovereignty and Sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty and sultanate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. The question is not whether or not we should leave Sultanate and sovereignty to the nation. That is already an accomplished fact -- the question is merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If those gathered here, the Assembly, and everyone else could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may roll in the process." (Lewis 1968: 258).

This speech silenced the opposition and led the National Assembly to pass on November 1, 1922, a law separating the Caliphate from the Sultanate and abolishing the Sultanate. Two weeks later, on November 17, 1922, the last Ottoman Sultan, Mehmet VI, fled Istanbul on a British submarine⁸.

The law that abolished the sultanate left the caliphate untouched. Perhaps the abolition of the caliphate was also one of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's "hidden intentions", but the religious significance and prestige of the institution among the populace as well as the deputies made the disclosure of that hidden intention too risky at the time. The law that abolished the sultanate also endowed the Grand National Assembly with the capacity to elect the Caliph from among the Ottoman ancestry. Hence, Abdülmecit Effendi, who had a favorable attitude towards the nationalist struggle, was elected as the Caliph.

Three weeks after that the abolition of the sultanate, on November 20, 1922, the Lausanne peace conference was opened with the participation of the Ankara government of Turkey, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, United States, and Japan. Bulgaria and the USSR participated as observers. At first, Great Britain also called the government of the Sultan to Lausanne as the representative of Turkey, alongside the Kemalist government of Ankara. However, the British stepped back over the Kemalists' fierce opposition to the idea. Mustafa Kemal's insistence on the abolition of the sultanate, to the extent of threatening the deputies if they did not go along with his proposal, had a great deal to do with that British attitude of seeing the sultan as the legitimate ruler of Turkey.

The Kemalists' basic strategy in Lausanne was to make peace and to be recognized by the Allies as the legitimate government of Turkey as soon as possible, even at the cost of leaving out some precious territory (such as Mosul and Kirkuk, Alexandretta (Hatay), Cyprus, and the Dodecanese islands) in foreign hands. The Kemalists did not want to risk an armed clash with the British over Mosul and Cyprus, with the French over Alexandretta, or with the

Italians over the Dodecanese islands.

However, a large group of deputies in the Grand National Assembly, which were later called the Second Group, criticized the Kemalist position and insisted on a tougher stance in the negotiations at Lausanne. The Second Group, which included many ex-CUP members who had also been deputies in the last Ottoman parliament which had been closed down by the Allies, was openly accusing Mustafa Kemal Pasha of using dictatorial methods and of surrendering the ancestral lands to the foreigners. There was a high probability that the Grand National Assembly under the influence of the Second Group would not ratify an agreement reached at Lausanne.

The Kemalist solution to this problem was to dissolve the Grand National Assembly on April 16, 1923 and to call for new elections. This could pass as a democratic solution if the Turkish delegation at Lausanne did not sign the final agreement on July 24, 1923, before the new elections were held and the new Assembly convened. After dissolving the first Assembly, the Kemalists prevented the members of the Second Group from running in the new elections, and the second Assembly which met on August 11, 1923 was formed of the loyalists of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. A month after the opening of the second Assembly, on September 9, 1923, the Kemalist deputies formed the People's Party (*Halk Fırkası*), later to change its name to the Republican People's Party (RPP), and elected Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the party's chairman.

This was in fact the beginning of the one-party regime and of the rule of the Kemalist bureaucracy without opposition. It was with this second and loyal Grand National Assembly which ratified without opposition the peace Treaty of Lausanne on August 23, 1923; declared Ankara as the new capital of Turkey on October 13; proclaimed Turkey as a republic and elected Mustafa Kemal Pasha as the republic's first president on October 29; abolished the caliphate on March 3, 1924; and made a new republican constitution on April 20.

The law that abolished the Caliphate also banished the members of the Ottoman house from the Turkish territory. The last Caliph, Abdülmecit Effendi, was immediately deported together with the other members of his family, not to return back to Turkey until today. The same law also abrogated the institution of *Şeyhülislam* and established the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a bureaucratic department of the state, as the highest Islamic authority in the country. Other laws that were passed in March and April 1924, closed down the private religious schools at all levels and the religious courts. The school system and the court system was unified under state-controlled secular organizations⁹. (The 1924 Constitution included a provision that Islam was the religion of the state. This provision was revoked four years later, in April 1928.)

In a process that started with the abolition of the sultanate in November 1922 and ended sixteen months later by the abolition of the caliphate in March 1924, the Kemalists demolished the two basic institutions of the Sultanate authority and established themselves as the supreme rulers of the state. They did what the previous three generations of the Ottoman bureaucratic movements, the Tanzimat Pashas, the Young Ottomans, and the Young Turks, had not been able to do.

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE KEMALIST REVOLUTION: THE SUPPRESSION OF THE ANTI-KEMALIST OPPOSITION AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ONE-PARTY REGIME, 1924-1927

After the liquidation of the political and religious bases of the sultanic authority and the establishment of the legal foundations of the new one-party regime, there occurred two opposition blocs against the Kemalists: The coalition of the Pashas and the Unionists (members of the former Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress), and the Kurdish Islamic-nationalists.

The Pashas were some of the prominent military leaders of the War of Independence who opposed not the new regime as such but the personal supremacy of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in it. The Pasha opposition was also joined by the former members of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, who were embittered for being overlooked and overpowered by the Kemalists despite the fact that it was them who had first organized the anti-occupation resistance movements in Anatolia. Those who looked for the restoration of the caliphate and members of the religious establishment whose prerogatives were destroyed by the Kemalists were also behind the Pashas. The second opposition bloc, the Kurdish Islamic-nationalists, were in disagreement with the secularist and Turkish nationalist character of the new state.

The Pasha-Unionist coalition chose the option of forming an opposition party on November 17, 1924, the Progressive Republican Party, to close their accounts with Mustafa Kemal Pasha¹⁰. At first, the Kemalists seemed to approve of the opposition party; and, on November 21, only five days later than the foundation of the new party, as a sign of goodwill (or weakness, depending on the perspective from which to look at matter), they dismissed the hard-core Kemalist İsmet (İnönü) Pasha as prime minister and replaced him with Ali Fethi (Okyar), an admittedly liberal and nonpartisan person. It seemed for a moment that the regime was advancing towards a two-party system. While the Pashas and the Unionists were forming a political party to press for their demands, the Kurdish Islamic-nationalists staged an armed rebellion in February 1925 to attain their goals¹¹.

The immediate reaction of the Kemalists to the Kurdish rebellion was to repeal the tithe (*öşür* or *aşar*) tax on February 17, 1925. The tithe was a traditional ten percent tax in kind levied on the peasants' soil products¹². Although constituting a substantial source of revenue for the state, the abrogation of the tithe tax was deemed necessary by the Kemalists to ensure the loyalty and tranquility of the Turkish landlords and small peasants in central and western Anatolia, who might as well be driven by the Islamic clergy into a religiously-based rebellion against the regime. The Kemalists did not forget that during the War of Independence the local Islamic clergy, on the orders of the sultan-caliph and *Şeyhülislam*, had instigated many peasant uprisings against the nationalist forces. Now that the new Kemalist regime was conducting a frontal attack on their prerogatives, the Islamic clergy had all the more reasons for rising up against the regime.

Although the Kurdish rebellion posed a serious challenge to the new regime, it also provided the Kemalists with a golden opportunity to develop effective new tools to deal with the opposition. It was on the pretext of suppressing the Kurdish rebellion that the Kemalists developed their most effective instruments, the Law for the Maintenance of Order and the Independence Tribunals, to crush both opposition blocs, those of the Kurds and the coalition of the Pashas and the Unionists.

On March 3, 1925 prime minister Ali Fethi (Okyar) was dismissed by the president for being soft on the Kurdish rebels and İsmet (İnönü) Pasha was again appointed to replace him. The next day, on March 4, the Grand National Assembly passed the Law for the Maintenance of Order and established the Independence Tribunals (the new law would remain in effect until March 1929)¹³. The Law for the Maintenance of Order endowed the government with dictatorial powers to deal with any person or group which it deemed posing some kind of a danger to the security of the state. The Independence Tribunals were staffed by the most militant Kemalist deputies of the Grand National Assembly, and initially two of them were established, one in Ankara and another in Diyarbakır in the east. The decisions of the tribunals could not be appealed, and the death sentences (there were many of them) were generally executed the next day.

By the end of June 1925 the government forces suppressed the Kurdish rebellion, captured most of its leaders, and the Independence Tribunal in Diyarbakır condemned forty of them to death (they were executed on June 29). In the meantime, on June 3, 1925, the government had used its powers under the Law for the Maintenance of Order and closed down the Progressive Republican Party. The closing of their party weakened but certainly did not stop the opposition of the Pashas, who still had influential followers in the military as well as among the civilians.

Just as they had given a tax concession to the peasants before moving on to crush the Kurdish rebellion, the Kemalists took three preparatory measures for securing their international standing and strengthening their internal support before the inevitable confrontation with the opposition bloc led by the Pashas and the Unionists.

The first preparatory tactic of the Kemalists was to conclude a friendship and non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union on December 17, 1925. The Kemalist government believed that Great Britain was supporting the Kurdish rebellion in order to weaken Turkey's hand in the Mosul issue. The rapprochement with the USSR was giving Great Britain the signal that if it ever provoked the Kurds in eastern Turkey to take up arms against the Kemalists, that would push Turkey even closer towards the Soviets. One other expectation of the Kemalists from this pact was to guarantee that the Soviets would not exploit Kurdish nationalism for destabilizing Turkey.

After stabilizing the Kurdish issue by this foreign policy maneuver, the Kemalist government devised two internal strategies to enlarge its support base in the society and at the same time shrink that of the Pasha-Unionist bloc. As it was indicated before, the Pasha-Unionist bloc drew its strongest support from the elites of Istanbul and the urban population in general. Hence, it was necessary for the Kemalists to win the Istanbul elites and the urban population to their side.

The first group the Kemalists aimed at turning into a support group for themselves was urban women in particular and women in general. The Kemalists' pivotal attempt to build a coalition with women came on February 17, 1926 when the National Assembly passed the new and revolutionary Civil Code (*Medeni Kanun*), which was almost a word-by-word translation of the Swiss law and conferred on women unprecedented new rights in the family as well as in public life. (The second big step the Kemalists took in their endeavor to

empower women was the law of December 8, 1934, by which women earned the right to vote and to stand as candidates in parliamentary elections)¹⁴.

The second group targeted by the Kemalists as a potential support group was the Turkish bourgeoisie. For this purpose, the Kemalist-controlled National Assembly enacted two important laws, in April and May 1926, that gave significant economic privileges to the national bourgeoisie. The law of April 19, 1926 granted the right to sail commercial vessels on Turkish waters exclusively to the nationals of Turkey. And the Law for the Promotion of Industry, dated May 28, 1926, endowed the Turkish investors with easy access to low-interest state credits, guaranteed state purchases of their products, and tax exemptions.

After these three preparatory measures, the time to smash the Pasha-Unionist opposition came. On June 17, 1926, the government unravelled a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha during his visit to İzmir¹⁵. The chief name behind the conspiracy was declared to be Ziya Hurşit, a deputy in the first Grand National Assembly and a prominent member of the Second Group which had opposed the Kemalists. During June-August 1926, in the two separate sessions held before the Ankara Independence Tribunal in İzmir and Ankara, the leading deputies of the defunct Progressive Republican Party, including four prominent pashas¹⁶ who had been the leaders of that party and serving as deputies in the Grand National Assembly, as well as the leading Unionists were tried. In the first session in İzmir, fifteen of the accused were sentenced to death, two of them in absentia. All of the thirteen who were present, convicted to death, and summarily executed were deputies in the Grand National Assembly and leading members of the closed Progressive Republican Party. The four Pashas who also stood trial were acquitted by the special intervention of President Mustafa Kemal. By so doing, Mustafa Kemal Pasha destroyed the entourage of the Pashas and tied the Pashas themselves to himself. Indeed, none of these Pashas created any serious problem for Mustafa Kemal Pasha from then on. In the second session held in Ankara, the Kemalist counterstrike was now directed towards the Unionists. The trial took the form of a Kemalist condemnation of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Young Turk era. In the end, four of the accused were sentenced to death and hanged. Among them was Cavit Bey, the famous finance minister of the Young Turk government between 1913-1918. Seven of them were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment¹⁷.

The suppression of the Kurdish revolt and the crushing of the Pasha-Unionist coalition prepared the ground for the unopposed rule of the Kemalists. In the general elections that were held in the fall of 1927 the Republican People's Party ran as the single party. Between October 15-20, 1927, in the second congress of the RPP, President and RPP chairman Mustafa Kemal read his famous long speech, the *Nutuk*, in which he reconstructed, from his perspective, the history of the Turkish revolution from the end of World War I to the foundation and consolidation of the Kemalist regime. The reading of the *Nutuk* symbolized the end of Kemalism as a revolution and its beginning as a political regime¹⁸.

Two further steps in fortifying the Kemalist political regime were taken by the RPP congresses in 1935 (when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was alive) and 1938 (immediately after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). In 1935, the fourth congress of the RPP took decisions that would unite the party and the state. Accordingly, the party's secretary-general was to become minister of the interior, heads of the provincial party branches were to assume the governorships of their provinces, and preferably all state officials were to be party

members¹⁹. The Congress also produced the first official definitions of the six principles (Six Arrows) of Kemalism: Republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), populism (*halkçılık*), etatism (*devletçilik*), secularism (*laiklik*), and reformism (*inkılapçılık*).²

The second step in defining and reinforcing the Kemalist regime was taken immediately after the death of Atatürk on November 10, 1938, and under the presidency of İsmet İnönü. The extraordinary congress of the RPP that met in December 1938, declared Atatürk as the Party's Eternal Chairman and the state's Eternal Chief. The acting president, İsmet İnönü, was elected by the same congress as the Permanent Chairman of the RPP and the National Chief. The favorite slogan of the congress was very much reminiscent of that of the Nazis: One party, one nation, one leader. From then on a personality cult around the National Chief was created and the regime became more like an oligarchy rather than a party regime²⁰.

² The original definitions of the six principles of Kemalism and of the Republican People's Party were as follows:

Republicanism: "The party is convinced that the Republic is the form of government which represents and realizes most safely the ideal of national sovereignty."

Nationalism: "The party considers it essential to preserve the special character and the entirely independent identity of the Turkish social community ... The party follows, in the meantime, a way parallel to and in harmony with all the modern nations in the way of progress and development, and in international contacts and relations."

Populism: "The source of all Will and Sovereignty is the Nation. ... We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the law, and who recognize no privileges for any individual, family, class or community, to be of the people and for the people. It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor... The farmers, handicraftsmen, laborers and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants, and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. ... The aims of our Party ... are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate ... to the amount of work."

Etatism: "Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interests of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible. ... The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the State depends upon the requirements of the greatest public interest of the nation. If the enterprise, which the State itself decides to undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in the hands of private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend upon the enactment of a law, which will indicate the way in which the State shall indemnify the loss sustained by the private enterprise as a result of this appropriation. In the estimation of the loss the possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration."

Secularism: "The Party considers it a principle to have the laws, regulations, and methods in the administration of the state prepared and applied in conformity with the needs of the world and on the basis of the fundamentals and methods provided for modern civilization by Science and Technique. As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers it to be one of the chief factors of the successes of our nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State."

Revolutionism-Reformism: "The party does not consider itself and the conduct of the state to be limited to gradual, evolutionary steps of development. The party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles which have since been elaborated." (Ahmad 1977: 4-6).

Although there was a parliament, the independent legislative powers of that parliament were extremely limited, as illustrated by the following anecdote by a contemporary reporter: "In 1945 the land reform bill was being debated in the Grand National Assembly and some Representatives criticized the Bill in unusually severe terms. National Chief İsmet İnönü got furious and said: 'Do these gentlemen believe that they really are the representatives of the nation?' (Karakuş 1977: 19).

THE KEMALIST RULING BLOC: THE CIVILIANIZED LEADERSHIP AND THE CIVILIAN LEADERS

One important characteristic of the Kemalist regime was the extraordinary powers of the president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, much greater than the party and the parliament²¹. Another characteristic of the Kemalist regime was the personalistic control of the military. The military was given to the responsibility of Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, who remained as the Chief of the General Staff for most of the one-party years, from 1922 to 1944²². Still a third characteristic of the Kemalist regime was that another pasha of the War of Independence, İsmet İnönü remained as Prime Minister for much of the one-party years when Atatürk was in life, and replaced Atatürk as president after the latter's death.

Hence, like the Young Turk triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas in 1913-1918, at the top of the Kemalist regime there was the triumvirate of Kemal, İsmet, and Fevzi Pashas: The president, the prime minister, and the chief of the general staff. The triumvirate was aided by a number of other civilianized soldiers who had taken active roles in the War of Independence. The triumvirate (with the exception of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak) plus other civilianized soldiers who occupied important positions in the party, parliament, and government formed together the **Civilianized Kemalist Leadership**. The pashas who had first acted against Mustafa Kemal but then silenced by him also became part of the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership.

Secondary to the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership in the Kemalist ruling bloc was the **Civilian Kemalist Leaders**, which comprised the prominent civilian allies of the military commanders during the organization of the anti-occupation movement and the foundation of the Republic. Although the top positions of the state (presidency and prime ministership) were reserved for the Civilianized Kemalist Leaders, the Civilian Kemalist Leaders did occasionally rise to those positions, such as Celal Bayar's short-lived prime ministry during 1938.

The undisputable head of the Civilian Kemalist Leaders was Celal Bayar (1884-1986; Minister of Economy, 1932-1938; Prime Minister, 1938; President, 1950-1960), who was about the same age as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, and Fevzi Çakmak. Bayar was an active member of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress before joining the nationalist resistance. During the one-party regime the Civilian Leaders occupied less important but still very influential posts in the party and the government, and especially in the economic bureaucracy. Celal Bayar was Minister of Economy between 1932-1938, and the founder and governor of the state-owned Turkish Business Bank (*Türkiye İş Bankası*), which was and still is Turkey's largest commercial bank.

Fuat Köprülü (1888-1966), the second big name of the Civilian wing of the Kemalist ruling bloc, was a leading intellectual and historian of the time. He was the dean of the Faculty of Letters at Istanbul University and served as a deputy in the Grand National Assembly. Refik Koraltan (1889-1974) served as a deputy during the whole one-party period, beginning with the first Grand National Assembly in 1920. Adnan Menderes (1899-1960; Prime Minister, 1950-1960), who was one generation younger than Bayar, was Inspector General of the People's Houses, the public education, information and propaganda network of the Republican People's Party.

Occupying secondary positions in the government was clearly a sign of relative powerlessness, but it had its advantages too. First of all, it made the Civilian Leaders less visible and thus protected them from criticisms. Secondly, it made the Civilian leaders more accessible to the non-state elites and to the people in general. Indeed, after the transition to the multi-party regime, the Civilian Kemalist Leaders saw the benefits of being less important figures during the one-party era. One important characteristic of the Civilian Kemalist Leaders was that most of them were of western Anatolian, especially Aegean, origin (Bayar was from Bursa in the Marmara region, and Menderes was from Aydın in the Aegean), which had been the site of the Greco-Turkish war and the principal regional center of nationalist resistance during the War of Independence.

The end of the one-party regime between 1945-1950 was precipitated by the breakdown of the Kemalist ruling bloc consisting of the Civilianized and Civilian leaders. This was due the liberalization and democratization policies of the Civilianized Leadership in order to win the support of the United States for protection against the USSR and for Turkey's full integration with the US-led Western world. As soon as the Civilianized Leadership created a liberalized space within the regime, the Civilian Leaders, who had always remained in a subordinate position, realized that their time came to assume a primary, or at least an equal, status vis-a-vis the Civilianized Leadership within the ruling bloc. Their first action was to try to come to the leadership of the RPP. When that failed, they broke up from the RPP and formed a second party, the Democrat Party (DP). Thus, the two wings of the Kemalist ruling bloc became organized in two different political parties. And the years that followed the foundation of the DP in 1946 and the first free multi-party elections in 1950 witnessed the intense power struggles between the RPP of the Civilianized Kemalist Leadership and the DP of the Civilian Kemalist Leaders. The 1950 elections brought the DP to power. The transition to democracy was therefore a transfer of power within the Kemalist ruling bloc, from the Civilianized Leadership to the Civilian Leaders. The resulting power transfer from one wing of the Kemalist ruling bloc to the other could not have taken place, or that it could have taken place without democracy and within the framework of the one-party regime. What gave this power transfer a democratic form was the effect of the postwar international circumstances on the strategies of the dominant Civilianized Leadership and the subordinate Civilian Leaders.

TWO INTERNATIONAL BULWARKS OF THE KEMALIST STATE IN THE MAKING: RECOGNITION BY WESTERN EUROPE AND SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP WITH SOVIET RUSSIA

The Kemalists founded and consolidated their regime during the interwar years under the international guarantees provided by two pivotal agreements: The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne with the Western powers and the 1925 Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviet Union. These two agreements supplied the Kemalists with a high degree of freedom from international interference, which was imperative for institutionalizing the revolution at home.

This situation is comparable to the international conditions surrounding the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (r. 1876-1909). Like the Kemalists, Sultan Abdülhamit too founded his modernizing dictatorship under the relatively stable international conditions following the 1878 Treaty of Berlin between the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and the

Western European powers. The international circumstances prevailing during both the Kemalist and Hamidian rules can be characterized as non-hegemonic²³. In the time of Sultan Abdülhamit the British hegemony was on the decline and it was being challenged by an ascendant Germany. Hence, Abdülhamit allied the Ottoman Empire with Germany to balance the influences of Great Britain and Russia. During the interwar years, there was similarly no clear hegemonic power in the world, and all candidates (Great Britain, Germany, Soviet Union, and United States) were preparing for the decisive battle to be fought during the Second World War. The Kemalists benefited from the great power competition during the interwar years, balancing one's challenge with the assistance of another. Unlike Sultan Abdülhamit and the Kemalists, the Young Turks founded their "enlightened despotism" in the middle of the First World War. Perhaps it was for this reason that very few of the initial reform projects of the Young Turks took root and became institutionalized

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne has been the most important international agreement of Kemalist Turkey. It was with this treaty that the great powers of the world recognized the Kemalist state as the legitimate authority within Turkey's current boundaries²⁴. For sixteen years following the Treaty of Lausanne, while the Kemalist regime was consolidating itself, Turkey did not enter into any military pact with the western European states. During that period, the Kemalist strategy was to make bilateral or multilateral pacts with neighboring states, the most important ones being the 1934 Balkan Pact with Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia and the 1937 Saadabad Pact with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan²⁵. The most important multilateral agreement of that period was no doubt the 1936 Montreux Convention regulating the regime of the Turkish Straits²⁶. Under the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne the Straits had been demilitarized and put under the supervision of an international commission. With the Montreux Treaty, which is still valid today, the conditions of demilitarization and international supervision has been lifted and Turkey has regained the right to militarize the Straits and regulate passage through the Straits.

Between 1923 and 1939, during this critical foundation stage of the Kemalist regime, the second bulwark of Turkey's international position, together with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, was no doubt the 1925 friendship and non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union²⁷. The 1925 Turco-Soviet treaty was continuously renewed and remained in effect for over two decades, until its unilateral cancellation by the Soviet government in March 1945. Under the terms of the 1925 treaty each of the two signatories would remain neutral if the other was at war with other states. More importantly, the signatories would not engage in any hostile act against the other and they would not enter into any economic, political or military alliances that would endanger the security of the other. It was after guaranteeing the alliance of the USSR and the security in their northeastern borders that the Kemalists set out to crush the two major internal challenges to their regime, posed by the Pasha-Unionist bloc in the big cities and the Kurdish rebels in the southeast. Moreover, it was the support of the USSR that strengthened Turkey's position against Great Britain in the Mosul affair, against France in the question of the French-occupied Syrian province of Alexandrette, and against Mussolini's Italy which was holding the Dodecanese islands under its occupation and reviving its First World War claims over the Mediterranean provinces of Anatolia. The Turkish-Soviet cooperation was also extended to the area of the economy, and many important projects of the Kemalist government were executed with Soviet credits, technical assistance, and central planning methods²⁸. The Soviet political regime, on the other hand, was providing the Kemalists with an excellent model to emulate when they were on their way

of building a one-party regime in Turkey.

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NOTES

1. There are plenty of sources, both Turkish and foreign, on the state strengthening and society-empowering reforms between 1789 to 1918, and bureaucratic movements from the Tanzimat Pashas to the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. For a general history of the period see Akşin (1990b), Dumont (1989), Dumont and Georgeon (1989), Georgeon (1989), Karal (1983a through 1983d), Lewis (1968, Papers IV through VII), Mantran (1989d), Ortaylı (1983), Shaw (1976, Papers 7 and 8), Shaw and Shaw (1977, Papers 1, 2, 3 and 4). For more specific information on the Tanzimat reforms, the Three Strong Pashas of the Tanzimat, and the Young Ottomans see Akarlı (1978, 1982a through 1982c) and Mardin (1962, 1982, 1990a). For Sultan Abdülhamit's reforms and political ideas see his own memoirs in Sultan Abdülhamit (1984). For the Young Turks see Arai (1992), Çavdar (1984 and 1991), Hanioglu (1989a and 1989b), Küçük (1984a and 1985c), and Toprak (1982).

² An official biography of Atatürk in English is published by the Turkish National Commission for Unesco (1981), written by a group of Turkish scholars and first appeared in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* (the Encyclopedia of Islam) published by the Turkish Ministry of Education in 1946. Atatürk's well-known biography in English is that of Lord Kinross (1981). The most authoritative source on the official version of the Kemalist ideology and history of the Turkish revolution is no doubt Atatürk's Nutuk (cited as Atatürk 1984), the long speech he delivered in 1927 on the occasion of the second general congress of the Republican People's Party. The book on Atatürkism published by the Turkish military after the military coup of 1980, Republic of Turkey. Office of the Chief of the General Staff (1988a), is the military's interpretation of the Kemalist ideology. Falih Rıfkı Atay's *What is Atatürkism?* (1966) is a nonacademic and rather impressionistic defense of Kemalism. For academic studies within the framework of the official ideology, see Karal (1981) and Kili (1982b and 1983). Examples of the critical studies on the Kemalist ideology are Ahmad (1985), Hardman (1990), Mardin (1981), and Parla (1991a 1991b). On the nature of the Kemalist political regime, good critical studies are Heper (1985), İnel (1984), Kazancıgil (1981 and 1984), Özbudun (1981), Rustow (1981), and Sunar (1974). An elaborate study on the foundation of the one-party regime under Atatürk is by Mete Tunçay (1989). Öz (1992) and Yetkin (1983) are two other recent contributions to the scholarship on the one-party regime in pre-Second World War Turkey. For civil-military relations under the Kemalist regime see the classical articles by Daniel Lerner and Richard Robinson (1960) and Dankwart Rustow (1959). Recent contributions are Bozdemir (1982, parts III and IV), Hale (1994, Paper 4), Kayabalı and Arslanoğlu (1976: 174-188), Özdağ (1991), Özdemir (1989a and 1989b), Öztürk (1993: 56-63). The nature of the Kemalist economic policies is studied in Ahmad (1981b), Birtek (1985), Boratav (1981 and 1982), and Hershlag (1958). Finally, Eisenstadt (1981) and Hayashi (1981) are to be consulted for a comparative look at Kemalism.

3. During the Ottoman Empire people had no official family names. There were instead civilian and military titles used before or after the first names, signifying a person's status. "Pasha" was the highest bureaucratic title, civil or military. If a person was a Pasha, the usual way to refer to him was to use his first name followed by the title Pasha: Ahmet Pasha, Mehmet Pasha, etc. Officers and officials whose ranks were less than Pasha, as well as non-state elites such as landlords and merchants, could be called in two ways. Either by the title "Bey" following the first name: Ahmet Bey, Mehmet Bey, etc. Or, by the first name following the rank: Miralay (Colonel) Ahmet, Serkatip (First Secretary) Mehmet, etc. Thus, the Civilianized Kemalist Leaders were called Mustafa Kemal Bey and İsmet Bey when they were junior officers. Right before the War of Independence they were promoted to general and by that time they were called as Mustafa Kemal Pasha and İsmet Pasha. Ten years after the foundation of the Republic, in 1934, taking family names was made a legal obligation for every Turkish citizen. In that year, a National Assembly decision conferred the name Atatürk on Mustafa Kemal and forbade any other person to take that name as his/her family name. İsmet Pasha

took the name İnönü (after the place he had won his first great victory in the War of Independence). So Mustafa Kemal Pasha became Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and İsmet Pasha became İsmet İnönü.

4. For the background to and terms of the Mondros Armistice of October 30, 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente Allies see Kili (1982b: 5-8), Lewis (1968: 239-242), Shaw and Shaw (1977: 327-328).

5. For more information on the Sèvres Treaty of August 10, 1920 see Kili (1982b: 84-86) and Shaw and Shaw (1977: 356).

6. The Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921 between the Ankara government and Soviet Russia was later complemented by the Kars Treaty of October 13, 1921 between the Ankara government and the Soviet governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.

7. On October 2, 1923, the last Allied contingents left Istanbul, and on October 6, 1923 the National Forces entered the city.

8. For further information on the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate see Atatürk (1984: 368-381, 427-438), Kili (1982b: 149-156), Lewis (1968: 256-271), Lord Kinross 1981 (340-388), Parla (1991a: 102-111), Republic of Turkey. Office of the Chief of the General Staff (1988a: 2-120), Shaw and Shaw (1977: 364-369), Tunçay (1989: 68-87), Turkish National Commission for Unesco (1981: 137-142).

9. For further information on the abolition of the caliphate see the sources cited in the previous note.

10. The chairman of the Progressive Republican Party was Kazım (Karabekir) Pasha, commander of the eastern armies. The vice-chairmen were Adnan (Adivar), a civilian, and Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay), a soldier. Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) Pasha was the party's secretary-general. The central committee included eight deputies from various provinces, one of them being a pasha. Thirty members of the Grand National Assembly joined the party. Most of the Istanbul newspapers were also supportive of the new party (Kili 1982b: 160-161). For more information on the Progressive Republican Party see Atatürk (1984: 440-458), Lewis (1968: 265-266), Lord Kinross (1981: 388-397), Parla (1991a: 136-140), Öz (1992: 88-98), Sezgin and Şaylan (1983), Tunçay (1989: 99-110, 370-382).

11. For the 1925 Kurdish rebellion, also known as the Sheik Said rebellion, see Lord Kinross 1981 (397-405), Mumcu (1991), Olson (1989), and Tunçay (1989: 127-142). The 1925 rebellion was the first of sixteen Kurdish rebellions against the new Turkish state, the last and the most serious one being the Dersim rebellion in 1937-38 (Tunçay 1989: 127-129).

12. For the tithe tax, its proportion in the state revenues, and the effects of its abolition see Silier (1981).

13. For the Law on the Maintenance of Order see Tunçay (1989: 127-175).

14. For more information on the 1926 Civil Code and on the "emancipation of women" in the Kemalist regime see Atatürk (1984: 455-459), Kili (1982b: 166-168, 179-180), and Lord Kinross (1981: 418-424).

15. The truth of the government's claim has not been established so far, and there are many arguments that this was just a fabrication of the Kemalists to use as a pretext for crushing the opposition. For more information on the anti-Kemalist conspiracy and related events see Kili (1982b: 161-162),

Lewis (1968: 275-276), Lord Kinross (1981: 396-404), Öz (1992: 96-97), Özdoğan (1981: 71-87), Öztürk (1993: 60-61), Tunçay (1989: 161-168).

16. The five pashas who stood trial in the Independence Court for involvement in the assassination attempt were Kazım (Karabekir), Cafer Tayyar, Ali Fuat, Refet (Bele), and Mersinli Cemal. All of them were leaders of the closed Progressive Republican Party, the first four of them were deputies in the Grand National Assembly (Tunçay 1989: 163).

17. For more information on the trials of the Unionists in connection to the assassination attempt and the Unionist-Kemalist relations see Tunçay (1989: 163-168).

18. For a Turkish text of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Speech see Atatürk (1984). For a critical reading of it see Parla (1991a and 1991b). The full text of the Speech is also available in English.

19. "More important was the absence of separation between party and government: in fact, the party was the government. Thus in many cases leaders of the provincial party were also governors of provinces, and almost all state officials became members of the RPP." (Ahmad 1977: 1).

20. For more information on the Kemalist regime after Atatürk's death see Ahmad (1977: Introduction), Karakuş (1977: Part 1), Kili (1976: 85-110), Lewis (1968: 288-319, 381-384, 469-474), Öz (1992), Shaw and Shaw (1977: 396-399) Toker (1990a), Ünal (1994), and Yetkin (1983).

21. Atatürk's extraordinary personal powers as president is illustrated by his following reply to his prime minister's question of what his powers as prime minister were: "Nominating and promoting military chiefs is one my jobs; do not meddle with the military. I will determine the ambassadors; do not interfere in foreign policy. The nominations of the provincial governors and police chiefs belongs to me; stay away from the Interior. As for the rest, do as you wish." (The conversation took place in October 1937, after Celal Bayar was appointed as Prime Minister by Atatürk. Cited in Mehmet Barlas's column in the daily Sabah, April 16, 1995, p.23).

22. "So long as Marshal Fevzi Çakmak was Chief of the General Staff there was hardly any question of bringing the army under civilian control. The defence budget was prepared at the General Staff Headquarters, and the Ministry of National Defence played only a subordinate role." (Ahmad 1977: 7).

23. I have referred to Wallerstein's *Geopolitics and Geoculture* (1991) for the periodization of the rise and the fall of the hegemonies at the world scale.

24. The Lausanne Treaty was signed on July 24, 1923. The participants in the Lausanne peace conference were Turkey, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, United States, and Japan. Bulgaria and the USSR participated as observers. For the full text of the treaty see Soysal (1989: 67-245). For more information on the political significance of the treaty see Kili (1982b: 109-117) and Shaw and Shaw (1977: 365-369). The only expansionary boundary change after the treaty of Lausanne was the annexation of the French-occupied Syrian province of Alexandrette in 1939. The status of the British-occupied Iraqi province of Mosul was decided by a League of Nations decision of June 5, 1925 which left Mosul under British control (Kili 1982b: 116).

25. The Balkan Pact was signed on February 9, 1934, with the participation of Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia (Bulgaria refused to enter the alliance). The four signatories mutually guaranteed the security of their Balkan frontiers. The Saadabad Pact, which was signed on July 8,

1937 between Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, included similar terms. For the full texts of the Balkan and Saadabad Pacts see Soysal (1989: 447-463, 582-588).

26. The Montreux Treaty on the Turkish Straits was signed on July 20, 1936. The signatories of the treaty were Great Britain, Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. All signatories, except Japan, deposited notices of ratification on November 9, 1939. Japan did so on April 19, 1937, and Italy adhered to the Convention on May 2, 1938. Under the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne the Straits were demilitarized and put under the supervision of an international Straits Commission. If Turkey was neutral, merchant ships were allowed free passage and restrictions were to be imposed upon the passage of warships of any power in peacetime or in war. If Turkey was in war, merchant ships and warships of neutral powers were to be allowed free passage. The Montreux Convention of 1936 has been the final international agreement on the issue of the Turkish Straits. The 1936 Montreux agreement allowed Turkey to refortify the Straits. According to the agreement, if Turkey is neutral, merchant vessels of all states are allowed free passage, and restrictions are to be imposed upon the passage of warships of both Black Sea and non-littoral states, in peace or in war. If Turkey is in war, commercial ships of states not at war with Turkey are allowed free passage by day only and via route to be indicated by Turkish authorities, and the passage of warships of all states is left to the discretion of Turkey. If Turkey considers itself under threat of war, commercial ships are allowed free passage by day only and via route indicated by Turkish authorities, and the passage of warships is left to the discretion of Turkey, but such decision subject to review of the League of Nations. For the full text of the Montreux Treaty see Erkin (1968: 397-410) and Soysal (1989: 493-519). For an extensive discussion of the Montreux Treaty and development leading to it see Erkin (1968: 63-122).

27. The December 17, 1925 Turkish-Soviet treaty of friendship and non-aggression was built on two previous friendship treaties that had been negotiated by the Kemalist government of Ankara, during the Turkish War of Independence and before the foundation of the Turkish Republic: The March 16, 1921 Moscow treaty with the Soviet Republic of Russia, and the October 13, 1921 Kars treaty with the Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. For the full text of the 1925 Turkish-Soviet friendship and non-aggression treaty see Soysal (1989: 264-273). For more information on the treaty see Erkin (1968: 246-249) and Gürün (1991: 109-132).

28. See Campbell (1974) and Hershlag (1958) for Soviet assistance in Turkey's development efforts in the pre-war era.